Four years ago, we wrote that the U.S. and China were at a “critical turning point.” During his presidency, Donald Trump had initiated a much harsher stance towards China, ending a half century of “engagement,” but it was not yet clear if the U.S. would sustain the new approach. Many observers, for instance, thought that if Joe Biden was elected in 2020, he would undo the trade war. (He didn’t.) At the time, it even seemed that the Trump administration had “used just about every tool in its shed to try and kneecap China” when it came to critical technologies. 

What we didn’t know was that, once elected, Biden would invent new tools to kneecap China’s technological rise, such as export controls on high-performance chips. The Biden administration not only continued Trump’s process of “decoupling” — including placing controls on U.S. investments in China — it also initiated efforts to “reshore,” such as plowing money into critical minerals and electric vehicle batteries, areas that China dominates. 

With the next presidential election between Trump and Kamala Harris just around the corner, we’re asking the same fundamental question: Where should the next U.S. president go from here? Is it time to temper the harsher policies towards China? Or is the U.S. just hitting its stride? 

Left: Former President Donald Trump speaks at a rally in Arizona, August 23, 2024. Right: Vice President Kamala Harris speaks at a rally in Arizona, August 9, 2024. Credit: Gage Skidmore via Flickr

Liza Tobin, who served as director for China in the National Security Council from 2019 to 2021, notes that the federal government is like an aircraft carrier: when it changes direction, it does so very slowly. While Trump initiated the turn, Biden saw it through. The question now, she asks, is “What is the intensity? Will a future Trump administration or Harris administration double down on this emphasis on ‘strategic competition’? Or are they going to try to stovepipe this issue so that they can deal with all these other problems in the world, like Israel or Ukraine?”

The next administration, adds Elizabeth Economy, a fellow at the Hoover Institution who served as senior advisor on China to the Commerce Department, has the opportunity to fine tune what ‘strategic competition’ should look like. 

The United States, she says, “has swung wide in its response [and] has not been as finely grained and nuanced as it could be. Now it’s time to calibrate our response…This is a moment, in the transition of administrations, to really dig deep to understand: Where are our policies working? Where are they not?”

To answer these questions and more, we turned to more than a dozen experts, policy makers, and politicians from across the political divide. We asked what a potential Trump vs. Harris administration would look like vis-a-vis China policy, where there is the most room for improvement or action, and perhaps most importantly, how Beijing would respond. 

What Should the Next Administration Prioritize?

#1 Get Back to Trade

Nearly everyone The Wire spoke to mentioned that Donald Trump, if elected, would prioritize a second trade war with China. Trump has already talked about raising tariffs on Chinese imports to an astonishing 60–100 percent.

Yun Sun, director of the China program at the Stimson Center, says this is unfinished business for Trump. “He was able to complete the ‘Phase One’ trade deal with the Chinese in January 2020, but the deal was not eventually implemented, so he has another chance,” she says. “The trade issue will be his top priority with China, and that includes export controls, the trade imbalance, and it also includes the issue of electric vehicles.”

Emily Kilcrease, a senior fellow at the Center for a New American Security, notes that Trump 2.0 would also have “a lot of interest in things like revoking China’s permanent normal trade relations status under¹Revoking China’s PNTR status would substantially increase average tariffs on a broad range of Chinese goods. the [World Trade Organization] and trying to expand bans on Chinese investment in the United States.” She also notes that the Phase One deal includes an innovative political process to resolve disputes bilaterally, “without any independent arbiters or any external panels.” It hasn’t really been tested, she says, but it could be. 

Most observers predict a continuation of Biden’s policies if Harris wins. They note, however, that there is room for her, or whomever is president, to do a lot more.

“Some people critique China for weaponizing its massive economy to build global leverage and influence,” says Jude Blanchette, China studies chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies. “My first thought is, ‘Gee, if only we had a massive economy that we could weaponize to build our leverage and influence.’ And, of course, we do. The United States market is deeply attractive, and both friendly nations and even some rivalrous ones would like more access to it. [With the next administration] there’s a chance to pivot away from a trade skeptic view, which I don’t think is doing much for the United States domestically, and certainly isn’t helping us internationally.” 

Although Biden continued Trump’s more protectionist policies, several experts The Wire spoke to agreed that the next president should be more pro-trade. 

“We are not involved in the CPTPP [Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership]. We’re not involved in the discussions on digital e-commerce in the World Trade Organization,” says Economy. “We are not going to be part of setting the rules and the norms for the next decades in these significant areas, and ultimately, our businesses and our consumers are going to suffer as a result of not having access to goods and services at reduced costs.”

Tobin, now at the Special Competitive Studies Project, notes that the next president could build on the U.S.’s market leverage by working with other nations, especially the EU and Japan, to remake the idea of “free trade among free people.” 

“The dream of global free trade is simply no longer valid in an era of a super-sized Leninist rival,” she says. “We need to sort of carve China out of this system and rebuild it with democratic market economies that actually practice free and fair trade.”

Congressman John Moolenaar (R-MI), chairman of the House Select Committee on the Chinese Communist Party, seems to agree: “Free markets require holding bad actors like the CCP accountable,” he told The Wire. “They can either abide by the same rules as everyone else, or we will find partners who will.” 

#2 Tend the Small Yard, Keep the High Fence

There was broad consensus among our interviewees that the next administration should continue Biden’s approach of preventing advanced technologies from reaching China. Most notably, Biden passed the CHIPS and Science Act, which authorized $52 billion in subsidies and tax credits for chipmakers expanding in the U.S., and instituted export controls on advanced chipmaking equipment.

There’s a growing recognition that simply punitive measures will not be effective. We need to be careful that the policies don’t smother the very thing we’re trying to nurture and protect.

Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor of China studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies

Da Wei, director of the Center for International Security and Strategy at Tsinghua University, says the so-called ‘small yard, high fence’ strategy “has already caused a lot of troubles for China’s companies and also innovation. It’s a more tailored and targeted approach towards China, though it sounds softer and not as harsh as what Trump said. It’s like a frog in the warm water: It’s not unbearable, but the frog will die over a decade or two.” 

Jimmy Goodrich, senior advisor to the RAND Corporation for technology analysis, notes the CHIPS Act has been a “game changer” for the U.S., which had seen its share of global chip production erode precipitously from 44 percent in 1990 to around 12 percent in 2020. “Now the U.S. is projected to halt that steep decline and actually see a bit of a turnaround,” he says.

Full self-sufficiency, he adds, is not yet achieved nor are the most advanced chips being produced on U.S. shores, but the rebound and newfound resiliency is cause to both celebrate and double down. The next president, he says, should be thinking about a supplemental bill to the CHIPS Act — call it CHIPS II — and “keep our eye on the ball here.”

“At the minimum, the tax credit has to be extended,” he says.²Chipmakers are eligible to receive a 25 percent credit on investments in manufacturing facilities planned to begin construction before January 1, 2027. “The CHIPS Act is kind of like a down payment to attract initial investment in capital. But to be successful long term, we have to be committed to this and ensure that incentives are going to stay there for the long haul.” 

President Joe Biden visited Intel’s Ocotillo Campus in Arizona to announce CHIPS and Science Act grants to expand U.S. semiconductor production, March 20, 2024. The White House via Flickr

Aaron Friedberg, a professor of politics and international affairs at Princeton University, argues that the next administration should also work on expanding the yard to include other industries. “I understand why the Biden administration has identified semiconductors, quantum computing and artificial intelligence as the targets,” he says. “But there’s a whole host of other things that are plausibly concerning that affect China’s ability to develop its military capabilities, including aerospace and shipbuilding.” 

Kilcrease, at CNAS, notes that the ‘small yard, high fence’ construction underplays the scope of the changes already implemented. “When you look across the range of things that we’re taking [export control] measures on, it’s not really a very small yard,” she says. There are also “some open questions about whether the fence is working … and how much China has been able to get around it, either through indigenous innovation or smuggling.”

The next president, she says, should focus on evaluating whether or not the strategy is working: “There isn’t a dedicated function within the government looking at this and thinking about unintended consequences.”

There is more debate over an area where China is far ahead: clean energy technologies. Congressman Moolenaar is currently co-sponsoring a bill that would stop the Department of Homeland Security from purchasing Chinese batteries from leading firms like Gotion or CATL. “Our military has already banned these batteries,” he says, “and the rest of the government should do the same.”

But Jessica Chen Weiss, a professor of China studies at Johns Hopkins University’s School of Advanced International Studies, cautions the next administration against excessive restrictions. “It’s clear that, at the moment, the technological leaders in the battery and solar space are Chinese firms, so there are downstream benefits to Americans of bringing in that technology.” (Trump, she notes, has signaled being open to Chinese investments in America’s green energy industry, although his running mate, JD Vance, recently came out strongly against it in a speech.)

“The balance of effort between slowing China down and ensuring that the United States runs faster should be tilted more toward running faster,” Weiss says. “There’s a growing recognition that simply punitive measures will not be effective. We need to be careful that the policies don’t smother the very thing we’re trying to nurture and protect.” 

#3 Re-Thinking Taiwan?

It hasn’t been lost on China watchers that the Republican Party has dropped any mention of Taiwan from its platform. In both 2016 and 2020, the GOP “saluted” the people of Taiwan and reaffirmed its commitment to the Taiwan Relations Act. 

It’s not clear why the GOP isn’t mentioning Taiwan this time, but Trump has previously made dismissive comments about the island.

“Trump’s approach is starkly transactional,” says Lizzi Lee, a fellow on Chinese economy at the Asia Society Policy Institute’s Center for China Analysis. “His notion that Taiwan should compensate the U.S. for its defense introduces volatility, potentially reducing Taiwan’s security to a bargaining chip. This could create instability in the region, simultaneously alarming and emboldening Beijing.” 

Maintaining “the status quo,” meanwhile, is the Democrats’ policy, according to its 2024 platform. 

“The Democratic Party continues to see Taiwan as a strategic asset,” Yawei Liu, senior advisor on China at The Carter Center, says. “Not just in terms of semiconductors, but also, to use the old Cold War terminology, it’s ‘an unsinkable aircraft carrier’ [i.e., an island that is useful for force projection].”

Rorry Daniels, managing director of the Asia Society Policy Institute, says the Taiwan issue “has the highest potential impact on not just U.S.-China relations, but the state of the global economy and the eventual security situation in all of Asia.” 

Whichever administration comes in next, she notes, needs a “thoughtful, not ideological” position, because the U.S. needs “to message restraint on this issue appropriately, so that Taiwan feels supported but Beijing feels that sufficient attention has been paid to its position and sensitivities.”

Given how large the U.S. looms in cross strait relations, Daniels adds, “there is some soul searching and reflection that should be done in how we’ve gotten to this point where the U.S. holds all of the levers. The U.S. doesn’t want to love Taiwan to death. We want to support Taiwan because of longstanding ties, the Taiwan Relations Act, and because of its sense of underdog and injustice. But at the same time, there’s no appetite in the electorate for confrontation between two nuclear powers.” 

The U.S. policy of so-called ‘strategic ambiguity’ towards Taiwan has been the same since 1979, but Weiss, who served as an advisor to the policy planning staff at the State Department under Biden, notes how the current president hinted at a policy shift when he repeatedly said the U.S. would defend Taiwan from any PRC invasion. (Biden’s staff walked back such statements every time.) She says the next administration should “exercise greater discipline in upholding the existing set of policies that have worked.” 

But Blanchette, at CSIS, notes that the next president might want to take a fresh look at the U.S.’s longstanding approach. 

“I agree with and support the overarching ‘One China’ policy, and think it has redounded to American interests and Taiwan interests,” he notes. “But the underpinnings of a One China policy are being destabilized, and it’s time to begin thinking about an innovative approach to how we’re going to maintain peace and stability.”

“We need a framework,” he says, “that explains to our allies and partners, but also to Beijing, when and why the United States feels compelled to give additional support for Taiwan…If China throws the equilibrium off balance, we’re going to have to use a corresponding toolkit to be able to reestablish that equilibrium, and that will include potentially more active military partnership and support of Taiwan across the spectrum.”

Oriana Skylar Mastro, a fellow at the Freeman Spogli Institute for International Studies at Stanford University, notes that the next president shouldn’t overthink any new approach. “I always think we should be loud on the defense side and quiet on the political side, such as not making trips to Taiwan and the President not making statements about Taiwan. We should focus on building up force posture in the region so that we could respond in a quick fashion to the contingency.”

The Trump administration took an approach of leading from the front. The Biden administration hews to the Obama team’s self-described ‘leading from behind’ approach. There needs to be a balance, but you can certainly end up in policy paralysis if you wait for your allies to get on board.

Ivan Kanapathy, who served as Deputy Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council between 2020 and 2021

A critical component of this strategy, however, is strengthening America’s relationships with allies and partners: “The United States can protect its interests,” says Mastro, “because we can project power in Asia, and we can only do that because countries host us.”

Speaking of allies…How should the next president think strategically about allies and other countries when it comes to China policy?

While there is generally strong bipartisan support for a lot of China policies, the question of how the U.S. should include its allies remains more contentious. 

Wen-ti Sung, a nonresident fellow with the Atlantic Council’s Global China Hub, argues that Trump’s isolationist tendencies will hurt his China policy. “Rather than concertedly managing China along with partners and friends, an America under Trump may have to manage China largely alone, and that will mean a lot less resources to draw on,” he says. One of America’s greatest strengths, he adds, is that it has “a much greater number of high-quality friends and partners than China.”

Liu, of the Carter Center, notes that when the U.S. teams up with its friends, it makes it more challenging for China to get what it wants or to negotiate individual deals. “Biden has managed to bring in NATO, to bring in major European countries and to bring in Japan, South Korea, Australia and others,” he says. “The Biden administration has even paid more attention to the Pacific Islands. In this sense, the Democratic administration’s China policy is tougher [than Trump’s first administration].”

Blanchette notes that even Biden’s critics “have had to begrudgingly admit that it is the coalition building that has been his great success.” But Ivan Kanapathy, who served as Deputy Senior Director for Asian Affairs on the National Security Council between 2020 and 2021, argues that bringing in partners is not always worth it. 

“For the past three years, the United States has been too deferential to some of its allies, in particular Western Europe, and has not moved rapidly or forcefully enough on several aspects of a competitive China policy,” he says. “The Trump administration took an approach of leading from the front. The Biden administration hews to the Obama team’s self-described ‘leading from behind’ approach. There needs to be a balance, but you can certainly end up in policy paralysis if you wait for your allies to get on board.”

Kanapathy notes that the one time that the Biden administration went out ahead — when it instituted wide-ranging chip controls in October 2022 — “they took a lot of flak from allies and have been hesitant to repeat that.” A second Trump administration, he says, would “lean more towards unilateral actions and pressuring allies to join later.”

Ryan Hass, director of the China Center at Brookings, says that a Harris presidency is likely to put coordination with allies first. “If you look at how she’s invested her time in Asia over the past three and a half years, it’s been in weaving together and strengthening relationships with and among allies,” he says. “That’s been the through-line of her contribution to foreign policy.” 

Who does China prefer? How will a Harris vs. Trump presidency affect China’s policies?

This was another question that split respondents. Nearly everyone agreed that a Harris administration would provide more stability to the bilateral relationship while a second Trump presidency would be more unpredictable, but there were several takes on which is more advantageous to China. 

Da, of Tsinghua University, says the most strident hawks in China prefer Trump for a simple reason: “The underlying assumption is they believe that if Trump is elected, the U.S. will suffer,” he says. “Maybe China will suffer too [under Trump], but they think so long as the U.S. suffers, then China wins.”

Kanapathy, however, says that Beijing fears a return to the unpredictability and confrontational posture that comes with President Trump. 

“Beijing is comfortable, although not happy, with the situation now [with Biden],” he says. “They have re-established multiple channels of influence and communication, especially with the economic agencies where they feel they have the most sway. This goes to the old Leninist adage about capitalists and rope [‘The capitalists will sell us the rope with which we will hang them’].”

Sun, at the Stimson Center, notes that Beijing also fears the existential threat Trump could represent. “Under the Trump administration, there was a tendency to pursue regime delegitimization. Mike Pompeo [who was Trump’s Secretary of State] and Matt Pottinger [Trump’s deputy national security advisor] would say publicly, ‘China is a good country, Chinese people are good people, but the Chinese Communist Party is a source of evil.’” 

If that kind of ideological stance reemerges, she says, Beijing would see it as “a matter of life or death” and it could cause “extremely rapid deterioration of bilateral relations between the U.S. and China.”

How much room Beijing will have to maneuver is another question. “The Democrats,” says Mastro at Stanford University, “are really just unhappy about how China is behaving, which opens up more possibilities for improvement in relations if China behaves in a different way.” 

There’s no replacement for strengthening ourselves, both in terms of our technology and manufacturing, but also in terms of our social cohesion. That’s the most important thing that the United States can do.

Elizabeth Economy, a fellow at the Hoover Institution who served as senior advisor on China to the Commerce Department

Da, however, notes that Trump might recede from the international stage, alienating U.S. allies, and leaving a vacuum for China to fill. 

“If Trump pressures Ukraine to negotiate with Russia,” he notes, “U.S.-Europe relations will run into some trouble. If China handles that smartly, maybe there will be more room for China and the European countries to improve their relations.” Similarly, if Trump pursues more strident economic nationalism, “China may have incentive to go the other way, embracing openness and multilateralism. He may push China to do something correct!”

Contingency vs. Agency 

Regardless of who wins in November, Blanchette urged humility when it comes to predicting U.S.-China relations. “As we’ve seen over the past eight years, contingency matters as much as agency,” he says. “The pandemic, a Russian invasion of Ukraine, a balloon — all of these have significantly affected the bilateral relationship to an extent that was not predicted in advance by external analysts.” 

Regardless of where the relationship goes, several respondents said the next U.S. president will need to make a stronger case to the American people about why and how China matters. 

“Without presidential leadership in our democracy, I don’t think you can generate the national resources to compete effectively the way that China has been doing for many years,” says Kanapathy. “Beijing is generating much more policy cohesiveness than Washington. They’re all swimming in the same direction, whereas in the U.S., you have China policy people that are pushing one way while climate policy or anti-trust policy might be moving in other directions.”

Mastro, meanwhile, says the next administration needs a “new rallying point.” “People are talking about the axis of autocracies and democracies,” she says. “But that’s not really where the challenge is. China has been able to work happily with democracies. It’s just that they try to avoid democratization.”

Whoever wins, Lee notes that Beijing’s overall strategy will remain largely unchanged. “Beijing’s leadership understands that its growth trajectory is dictated more by its own capabilities and policies than by who occupies the White House,” she says. “Beijing continues to prioritize domestic stability, economic development, and institutional resilience, aiming to project itself as a reliable and stable global player.”

It’s a strategy, Economy notes, that would serve the U.S. well too. “There’s no replacement for strengthening ourselves, both in terms of our technology and manufacturing, but also in terms of our social cohesion,” she says. “That’s the most important thing that the United States can do.”