The heavy focus placed on maritime issues in U.S.-China relations can breed a habit of paying less attention to China’s activities across its land borders. Yet Beijing is finding itself bound into complicated situations in a growing list of places across the wide Eurasian landmass. ‘China the peacemaker’ may be the narrative the Chinese leadership wants to promote: But it is unclear whether it has any more answers than those who have gone before to long-running problems in complex regions where it is increasingly becoming one of the most consequential players on the ground.
The most acute conflict is in Ukraine. China’s ‘no limits’ partnership with Moscow made it clear early on in the war which side Beijing had chosen. Even so, Ukraine’s general reticence to condemn Chinese support for Russia has highlighted the important role that Kiev obviously still sees for Beijing in its future. Prior to the Russian invasion, China was Ukraine’s biggest economic and trade partner, and until recently Chinese firms were undertaking large investments in the country.
China’s much vaunted peace plan, proposed in February, was its way of trying to show a positive face against this backdrop of broad goodwill for Beijing from both protagonists. Yet while the plan was received more positively around the world than in Western capitals, it has not come near to delivering peace — or any real change — in any visible way on the battlefield.
Left: German Federal Chancellor Olaf Scholz meets with Xi Jinping, November 4, 2022. Credit: The Federal Government. Right: French President Emmanuel Macron meets with Xi Jinping, April 6, 2023. Credit: Ludovic Marin via AP Newsroom.
Meantime China’s posturing is in turn eroding its influence in Europe. A succession of European leaders, including Germany’s Olaf Scholz and France’s Emmanuel Macron, have visited Beijing to hammer home their concerns about the war, and their hopes for China to restrain President Putin. The longer this drags on, the fewer sympathetic ears Beijing will find in European capitals — a problem for China, which is constantly seeking to expose differences between Europe and the United States. Even in Kiev there is evidence of wariness towards China emerging, with the country’s National Security Council calling for a review of the dominance of Chinese hardware in the country’s technology infrastructure.
In the Middle East, there are worrying touches of hubris in Chinese behavior. Parachuting late into Omani-Iraqi brokered discussions between Iran and Saudi Arabia, China’s top diplomat Wang Yi made great play of how Beijing had finally resolved an issue the West had failed to for years. There is no doubt it was an important diplomatic breakthrough, which has led to some tangible moves (like the re-opening of Embassies, as well as talk about cooperation in joint energy projects) between the two countries.
The truth is China has no more answers than anyone else about how to deal with the Afghan leadership. Yet, it is now the big power in the neighborhood that the Taliban look to for their economic answers.
Yet the pair’s underlying differences have not gone away. Iran continues to stoke fires against its adversaries, and the conflict in Yemen has not been resolved. In a possible demonstration of Chinese misreading, energy firm Anton Oilfield Services Group signed an agreement with the Houthi government in Yemen on May 21st, only to issue a nullification statement two days later.
But Beijing seems to think it now has a magic touch in the region, and has since revived the idea of brokering peace between Israel and Palestine. President Xi Jinping recently hosted Palestinian leader Mahmoud Abbas, putting forward a three-point plan to resolve the long-running conflict. This is not the first time China has sought this role: It first appointed a Special Representative for Arab-Israeli relations in 2002, but there is little evidence that the Chinese diplomats appointed to the role have been able to achieve much. By now trying to take a more prominent role in resolving the conflict, Beijing risks raising hopes it cannot possibly meet.
For sure, there has been a notable economic push to accompany this latest surge of Chinese attention in the Middle East which culminated in President Xi’s visit to Riyadh for the first China-Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) Summit in December 2022. Back in March 2021, Iran signed a 25-year strategic agreement with China, reportedly involving hundreds of billions of dollars. Last month, Saudi Arabia and China signed $10 billion worth of deals in a two-day Arab-China business summit in Riyadh. In November 2022, Sinopec signed a mammoth 27-year agreement to purchase liquefied natural gas (LNG) from Qatar valued at around $60 billion. The company also purchased an interest in the North Field East expansion project in April.
As a growing wave of Gulf and Arab dealmakers head to Beijing, China is becoming more economically enmeshed with the region. That, though, only raises the stakes still further for China. The more it has invested in the Middle East, the greater the potential downsides of its diplomatic wranglings failing to bear any fruit.
On the other side of Iran, Afghanistan offers the most glaring example of the limits and of Chinese efforts. Whilst publicly there has been much positivity around the relationship between China and the Taliban authorities in Kabul, there is scant evidence of success for Beijing. The Taliban have done little to curtail the activities of Uighur militant groups that the Chinese leadership sees moving around within Afghanistan’s borders. At the same time, Chinese investment has been relatively limited — only one large project has moved ahead, while others that the Taliban would like to see started show little sign of progress. The Taliban continue to hold meetings with Chinese businessmen, but consequent projects seem limited and the state itself is not always engaged. Much Chinese economic activity has been driven by Chinese entrepreneurs seeing an opportunity in underinvested Afghanistan, but even they have begun to be frustrated.
All around Afghanistan, in Iran, Central Asia and Pakistan, China has created and engaged with bilateral and multilateral forums to either help manage problems emanating from Afghanistan or engage with the Taliban. But none have managed to change much on the ground. The truth is China has no more answers than anyone else about how to deal with the Afghan leadership. Yet, it is now the big power in the neighborhood that the Taliban look to for their economic answers.
This highlights the bigger problem which increasingly animates Chinese foreign policy. Beijing gets a lot more attention than it used to, thanks to its money and status in world affairs. This has inevitably led to comparisons with the U.S.. Yet for all its faults, America still has far greater resources, patience and capability to try to deal with global issues. And while it is equally clear Washington does not always have the answer (and in some cases makes things worse), they do still try to do the right thing – for example, the United States continues to be the largest aid donor to Afghanistan.
Rather than fixing anything meaningful, in practice Beijing often still sticks to its time-honored custom of watching situations play out and then dealing with whoever emerges on top.
Beijing, by contrast, risks the appearance of dabbling, using its wealth to increase its influence and profile, but then only stepping gingerly into the waters of conflict resolution without fully thinking through the consequences. Its economic weight and gravitas makes it a player in most contexts where it decides to get involved, yet it seems to lack the focus and tools to then turn this into influence that seeks to really change things on the ground. Instead, China often seems more eager to be seen to be acting, merely to highlight its differences with the U.S.’s approach. Rather than fixing anything meaningful, in practice Beijing often still sticks to its time-honored custom of watching situations play out and then dealing with whoever emerges on top.
By doing so, Beijing is playing a risky game of raising expectations, only to find itself ever more stuck in intractable conflicts, while potential allies lose faith as they grow frustrated with its inaction. As Spiderman discovered, with great power comes great responsibility — Beijing is now learning that the hard way too.
Click here to read Andrew Peaple’s Q&A with Raffaello Pantucci for The Wire China.
Raffaello Pantucci is a scholar and senior fellow at the S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies (RSIS) in Singapore and a senior associate fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI).
