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Graham Allison is the Douglas Dillon Professor of Government at Harvard University where he studies national security with special interests in nuclear proliferation, China and Russia. Professor Allison was the first dean of the John F. Kennedy School of Government at Harvard and served as the director of its Belfer Center for Science and International Affairs until 2017. He is the author of the 2017 book Destined For War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’s Trap? and co-author of the series, The Great Rivalry: China vs. the U.S. in the 21st Century. Serving as assistant secretary of defense in the Clinton Administration, Allison received the Defense Department’s highest civilian honor, the Defense Medal for Distinguished Public Service for his efforts to denuclearize former Soviet states. He earned a B.A. in history from Harvard, an M.A. in politics, philosophy, and economics from Oxford University, and a Ph.D. in political science from Harvard. The following is a lightly edited transcript of a recent interview.

Q: You published Destined for War in 2017, in which you talked about the risk of conflict as the world’s dominant power — the U.S. — is challenged by a rising one — China. What exactly is this so-called Thucydides Trap in your own words? Five years later, do you see that risk as having heightened or lessened?

A: The Thucydides’ Trap is the dangerous dynamic that occurs when a rapidly rising power threatens to displace a major ruling power. It’s the phenomenon that we see in classical Greece that Thucydides wrote about, as Athens rose rapidly to challenge Sparta, which had been the predominant power in Greece for a century. It’s the phenomenon that we saw at the beginning of the twentieth century, when Germany was rapidly challenging the position of Great Britain, which had ruled the world for 100 years or longer. And it’s the phenomenon that we’re seeing today with the meteoric rise of China, that is threatening to displace a ruling U.S. which has been the predominant power, creating and supervising the international order for the past seven decades. So that’s the Thucydides’ Trap. 

If history is our guide, things will get worse before they get better. Some people accuse me of helping precipitate conflict. But for good or for ill, words are not driving what is going on. What is driving what’s going on are fundamental structural factors. I would say the risks have increased over the past five years because, principally, the structural shift has continued, in which the rising power is actually rising, and the ruling power is feeling alarmed about what’s happening to its position. If Thucydides were watching, he would say, “the two parties are right on script, each of them seemingly competing to show which can better exemplify the role of the ruling power.” He’d be sitting on the edge of his seat, awaiting the grandest collision of all time.

Do you think that the increased hostility between the U.S. and China can become a more stable relationship in the long run? In other words, can trade wars replace actual wars?

What’s driving the rivalry between the U.S. and China are real structural factors. At this stage, virtually no one can deny that China is a meteoric rising power. If you look at where the U.S. and China were at the beginning of the century, and what’s happened in the first 21 years, you see a seesaw in every arena that was favoring the U.S. and now it is favoring China. What is the impact on the parties of a seesaw that shifts rapidly? Before, the U.S.’s feet were on the ground, and they were in control and China was on the other side of the seesaw. If China didn’t do what the U.S. liked, they could jiggle China a little bit. Now, suddenly, China is bulking up, and the seesaw is shifting, and the U.S. is feeling their feet lift off the ground. The U.S.’s whole perception of what’s going on, the sense of threat to their identity, and their expectation about why China is doing this is changing. 

This is reflected in more hostile relations in every dimension. One dimension is in trade, and you have tariff wars. Often, as in the case of the Trump tariff wars, the net impact has been negative for the U.S., although the fact that tariffs hurt you, doesn’t mean you don’t impose them. The embargo on advanced semiconductors has had a significant impact on Huawei. These trade moves result in increased hostility in the South China Sea and the East China Sea. 

Far from trade displacing or replacing war, it’s just another symptomatic area in which you see the rivalry playing out. In the extreme case, we should remember that trade wars have sometimes triggered hot wars. A vivid example is the trade strangulation of Japan prior to World War II that led the Japanese to believe they had a choice between being strangled slowly, or taking a chance on breaking out. They took a chance on what was ultimately a horrific war.

Going back to the time of Thucydides, the Peloponnesian War was largely sparked by the breakdown of alliances and military conquest. When it comes to U.S.-China relations, we do not see the breakdown of any alliances; however, we do see Chinese expansion in the South China Sea and tension in Taiwan. Is this territorial expansion the most likely spark to a U.S.-China conflict? 

The most likely way the U.S. and China go to war is over Taiwan. The Chinese would say you shouldn’t call that territorial expansion but rather their recovery of an errant province. The reason why that’s so dangerous is that from a Chinese perspective, this is inherently part of China. From the Chinese perspective, and this is correct, the basis on which they established relations with the U.S. 50 years ago, was our recognition that there was only one China, and its capital was in Beijing, and there’s no independent country called Taiwan. What’s happened in the decades since is that Taiwan has grown to be a vibrant democratic market economy, functioning as if it were an independent country, even though it’s “part of China.” 

From the Chinese perspective, this has been part of their experiment with “One China, Two Systems” and so forth, a story that after Hong Kong looks much more interesting to Taiwan. From the American perspective, now that the relationship with China is much more hostile, you have an impulse (certainly in the Republican Party) to even recognize Taiwan as an independent country. Mike Pompeo, one of the potential candidates for the Republican nomination [for President in 2024] has recommended the recognition of Taiwan as an independent country. Every Chinese scholar I know of, and every Chinese leader I’ve ever talked to, believes that if that were to happen, China would go to war to seize Taiwan. In the current military balance, because it’s changed so dramatically in China’s favor in the region, in a local war only over Taiwan, it is most likely China would win. The American president at that time would then face the choice between expanding the war or losing the war and that’s a good way to get to an expanded war. At the end of an expanded war, is a total war. At the end of a total war, both the U.S. and China are destroyed because China now has a nuclear arsenal capable of attacking the U.S. and thus destroying us.

Given that you think that the most likely cause of war between the U.S. and China involves military action surrounding Taiwan, what do you think the U.S. should do if China actually invades Taiwan?

[It] depends on the circumstance, and that’s the essence of strategic ambiguity. The important thing is to prevent this happening, since if it did, the U.S. has no good choice.

Much of your argument around the Thucydides Trap lies in the exponential growth of China’s economy; however, it is unclear if that growth is sustainable for China, especially following COVID. Do you think that Chinese economic supremacy is still inevitable?

I would say not inevitable but very likely. And the fundamental reason why is that with a population four times the size of the U.S., and a population that’s graduating four times as many STEM [science, technology, engineering and mathematics] students every year, and a population that’s pretty smart and pretty hard working, maybe even more hard working than we are, China will have a GDP twice the size of the U.S. in the future. Today, it has a per capita income only one quarter that of the United States. If the Chinese labor market should prove to be only half as productive as the U.S., with four times as many people, you will see a GDP twice the size of ours. Absent some great departure from the fundamentals, it’s likely that over the decade ahead, you will see, in market exchange rate terms, China surpass the U.S. as it has already done in purchasing power parity terms, which is the preferred yardstick for the CIA and the IMF for comparing national economies. 

Which major economy was the only one not to go into recession after COVID? Only one: China. 

The second point to make about this is, I see every day in the coverage of the Wall Street Journal and The New York Times stories about the China economic slowdown. This is the same storyline from 2012 to 2017. The China slowdown is a very attractive storyline that the American press plays whenever there’s a bit of evidence that suggests it, but what they don’t point out is slowing down compared to whom? Because if you think about this as the economic Olympics, the question is not whether I’m running slower than I did before but how am I running relative to my competitors? If you ask, which economy is more likely to see a recession in the next year, the U.S. or China, most people would say, “the U.S., but still, let’s focus on China.” The question for Thucydidean purposes is how is China doing compared to the U.S.? COVID is another good example. Every day you have a story about the disaster of the Chinese COVID strategy, but the Chinese say, “how many Chinese per capita died from COVID compared to the U.S.?” The evidence would say about one-eight hundredth. Which major economy was the only one not to go into recession after COVID? Only one: China. 

How does President Biden’s recommitment to NATO change the dynamics of the U.S.-China relationship? Will stronger international alliances lead to a decrease in U.S.-China tension?

This is a question about how Putin’s invasion of Ukraine impacts China and China-U.S. relations. I would say that Xi Jinping is obviously conflicted about this. On the one hand, the more the Russian threat to Ukraine and Europe captures American attention, the less attention there is for China. Since what he wants most from the U.S. is simply to be neglected, that is a victory for him. On the other hand, conflict has forced China, in its attempt to align with Russia, to violate its fundamental building blocks which are sovereignty and territorial integrity. 

Secondly, now that they’ve discovered, lo and behold, the Ukrainians have a great capacity and will to fight and are fighting successfully, and that the U.S., NATO, Japan, and Australia have actually aligned, the Chinese are troubled. This will end up not decreasing the tension but increasing tension because China will look at what the U.S. is doing with their alliances in Asia and will see that they look a lot like NATO. They see the Quad with the U.S., Japan, India, and Australia, the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty, the U.S.-South Korea treaty, as efforts to have an Asian analog of NATO. If you listen to the American description of what the Quad is, we say it’s about getting a group of aligned countries on our side of the seesaw so we can counterbalance an ever-growing China. The possibility that the U.S. would use some of the economic instruments that it has weaponized in the “economic war” against Russia, against China, has certainly gathered Chinese attention. This is making the relationship more tense rather than less.

Although China says that it is sticking to its principle of non-interference by not taking sides in the war in Ukraine, it is clear through Xi’s relationship with Vladimir Putin and domestic censorship of the war that China aligns much more closely with the Russians. In your opinion, why has Xi chosen this path?

I gave 4-1 odds to about 20 people in Washington that Russia would not invade Ukraine before February 24. The closing ceremony of the Beijing Olympics was February 24 and there was no way in hell Putin was going to rain on Xi’s parade. The basis for this is understanding how serious the alliance Xi has built with Putin is. This is operationally the most significant undeclared alliance in the world, and most Americans still have not awakened to it because they don’t call it an alliance. At the February 4 meeting before the opening of the Olympics, they put up this 5,000-word statement in which they call their relationships a “no-limits comprehensive partnership.” A no-limits partnership is a few steps beyond most U.S. treaty alliances. I expect Xi told Putin at that February 4 meeting that “the timing doesn’t work for me, but you have to do what you have to do and in any case, we’ll have your back.” Since then, if you watch all of China’s behavior, it’s been very consistent with this. The main advantage for Xi is that all the oxygen for American policy has been sucked out of Washington by their focus on Europe. 

The basic point is that first, there’s a very big alliance that’s operationally significant. Secondly, that even though, from our perspective, it seems bizarre, from a Chinese perspective, if the Americans are focused on the European threat, they’re not focused on China and China can continue growing their trade relationships with everybody, making everybody else dependent on them, and strengthening their position.

You wrote in a recent op-ed that Xi Jinping has the potential to broker peace in Ukraine. Although he certainly may be able to, is it in his best interest to end a war that is curbing economic growth in much of the West? 

The advantage would be that he likes the comparison of himself to Teddy Roosevelt. Teddy Roosevelt in 1905, when the U.S. was not a global player, was supremely confident that we were entering the American century. He inserted himself halfway around the world with two powers we hardly had any relationship with: Japan and Russia. He negotiated peace in the Russo-Japanese War and got a Nobel Peace Prize for it. 

From Xi’s point of view, he’s thinking, “I’ve got a good relationship with Putin and China is the biggest trading partner of Ukraine. It’s a big lift, but if I were to do this, it would be a hell of an act.” The negative is if the war drags on, and keeps the Americans preoccupied — the war is not so bad and making peace may not be desirable. 

Could the West apply the same full press sanctions they have on Russia against the Chinese if they choose to invade Taiwan in the future? Given the importance of Chinese supply chains, would these sanctions be tenable?

It’s a great question and nobody knows the answer. I’m sure the Chinese are analyzing this carefully. China is the major trading partner of every major economy except ours, and the second for us. It is the major trading partner of the EU, the major trading partner of Japan, the major trading partner of 130 countries. China is the workshop of the world. Most manufactured products come from China. China is the major supplier of manufactured products to the U.S.; go to Walmart and see where things are made — most everything is made in China. Apple iPhones — 80 percent of it is assembled in China. Can you imagine cutting that off? We are seeing the struggle now for Europeans with gas and oil from Russia. Imposing similar sanctions on China would be a real stretch. 

Could you do some selective decoupling? Yes. You can already see that with advanced semiconductors. You’ll see that more in areas that have any security application. The entanglement is thick now and it would be extremely difficult to do what we’re doing to the Russians to the Chinese.

For citizens, upending the economy in fairly flabby democracies, where people are not used to tolerating much pain for very long, is extremely costly.

On the other hand, if we ended up with a war over Taiwan, things could change very dramatically. But again, the impact on the American economy or the German economy or the Japanese economy would be huge. For citizens, upending the economy in fairly flabby democracies, where people are not used to tolerating much pain for very long, is extremely costly. One of the fascinating things to watch, even with the sanctioning of Russia, is how every time Biden tries to tighten the screws, he says, “of course, we’re not going to affect the price of gasoline” as if the two things weren’t connected. He’s concerned rightly, that when people are pissed about inflation, November’s coming up, Democrats will be punished. Is that a real constraint in American policymaking? Unfortunately, it is. 

In a post-pandemic world, what are the clearest ways for the U.S. and China to avoid military conflict? 

I believe we can. If we settle for business as usual or diplomacy as usual, then we should expect history as usual. History as usual would be a war. The Cold War is a dramatic example, where we should have had a war but because of a great surge of strategic imagination, we invented a strategy for something called the Cold War, which actually is not war. In the Chinese case, I’ve found nine possible paths to escape the Thucydides Trap. None of them are compelling, but the one that is the closest is some version of both competition and coexistence at the same time. 

There are multiple compelling imperatives for cooperation. However, there are inescapable structural reasons for rivalry

Rivalry-Partnership is a term from Chinese, where about 1,000 years ago, in the Song Dynasty, they were able to defeat a northern Mongol tribe called the Liao. They negotiated the Chanyuan Treaty, in which they agreed to be fierce rivals in some realms, and great partners in others. What would this look like in U.S.-China relations? Of course, we’re going to be fierce rivals in who will have the leading economy, in AI, in quantum, in advanced IT. In the military realm, we will be rivals in who will have the more powerful capability to affect events in the South China Sea, the East China Sea, and globally. 

At the same time, both the U.S. and China know they’re living on a small planet with an enclosed biosphere in which each of them is the two biggest emitters of greenhouse gases, and either of them can emit so much greenhouse gas that the biosphere becomes unlivable for everybody. There is potential for collaboration on climate change. Secondly, the Chinese have a nuclear arsenal that the U.S. can’t destroy. If the U.S. goes to war with China, China erases the U.S. from the map. The U.S.’s survival requires them not to have a war with China. Can we work out some way to try to constrain the forms of competition that are most likely to drag us into a war, like, for example, over Taiwan? There’s a third dimension of this if you look at pandemics or other transnational events, like nuclear proliferation. If pandemics can become so deadly that they actually threaten both the US and China’s well-being, maybe they have a common interest in trying to find a way to stop them. There are multiple compelling imperatives for cooperation. However, there are inescapable structural reasons for rivalry. 

Could you have competitive coexistence in which we are both seriously competitive and inescapably cooperative? F. Scott Fitzgerald says, “the test of a first-rate intelligence is the ability to hold two opposing ideas in mind at the same time and still retain the ability to function.” Can we as people hold two contradictory ideas in our mind and still function? I would say maybe. Could two governments do this? It would be harder. For two societies it would be even harder, but not impossible. I remain optimistic.

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