Almost six months have passed since the military coup in Myanmar that shocked the world. Some observers initially hoped that China, for years the southeast Asian nation’s most consequential external partner, would use its influence to try to reverse the generals’ takeover. Instead, it has become increasingly clear that Beijing has now accepted the return of military rule. This apparent acquiescence raises several questions over China’s future role both in Myanmar and beyond. 

For five months after the coup on February 1, China maintained a rather ambiguous attitude towards the junta’s legitimacy, refraining from official interactions with the new government. This period of ambivalence officially ended on June 8, when Chinese Foreign Minister Wang Yi held a formal and public meeting in China with his Burmese counterpart Wunna Maung Lwin, who was appointed by the junta after the coup. The Chinese government clearly understood the political significance of this meeting and its implied message that it has now accepted the junta as the legitimate sovereign ruler of Myanmar. 

Multiple factors contributed to Beijing’s decision to end its ambivalence, with the most important being domestic developments in Myanmar since the coup. Many Burmese people clearly resent the military’s return to full power: Myanmar has in the past five months witnessed the emergence of an opposition movement — the National Unity Government (NUG) — as well as numerous public protests and a growing armed resistance across the country. But the hard fact is that there is no political force within the country that is strong and cohesive enough to effectively challenge the military. The most likely candidate to do so — the Burmese-dominated NUG — remains divided, does not possess a strong or comparable armed force, and suffers from profound rifts with Myanmar’s large ethnic populations.  

The reality tacitly acknowledged by most observers is that the junta has succeeded and will prevail for the foreseeable future. As a consequence, Myanmar is entering another potentially lengthy period of military rule: last time around, the army was in charge for five decades, from 1962 to 2011. 

But while many Western countries still see the coup as unacceptable, Beijing does not share that view. After all, China’s definition of political legitimacy and its origins is fundamentally different from that of the West. From China’s point of view, the junta has prevailed and given that there is no effective challenger to its rule in the country, political recognition is merely a matter of practicality. Moreover, the political turmoil in Myanmar hasn’t changed China’s many core interests there, which include border stability, access to the Indian Ocean, and economic influence through the Belt and Road Initiative-related infrastructure and development projects. 

Yet even though the future trajectory of Burmese politics might appear certain in China’s eyes, equally certain is the prospect of continuing local unrest, domestic instability and popular resentment against the junta. Each will have a critical and potentially painful impact on China’s presence and influence in the country. 

If China had the choice, it probably would have preferred a Myanmar governed by the National League for Democracy (NLD), as per the result of the elections held in late 2020. Under the NLD,  Myanmar’s government had been practical enough over the past five years to repair ties with Beijing, relying on it for support over the Rohingya crisis and working with it on Belt and Road projects. The huge popularity of the NLD government and its leader Aung San Suu Kyi ensured local acceptance of Chinese economic projects and reversed the anti-China sentiment previously prevalent among the population due to Beijing’s cooperation with the former military junta. 

Now history is repeating itself, and China is once again acquiescing to military government in Myanmar. Of course, even if Beijing were to reject the junta and pursue economic sanctions, in line with many Western countries, it would be unlikely to reverse the coup given that the military has long proven immune to external pressure. Indeed, many would agree that anything short of a military intervention will be unlikely to remove the junta — and even that would more likely lead to a civil war, rather than the reestablishment of democratic government. 

But though China may see the coup as irreversible and has thus made the pragmatic decision to accept it, that position is not without consequences. 

Most importantly, by siding with the Burmese military, China has once again alienated the Burmese public. Immediately after the generals’ takeover, there were many emotional pleas from the Burmese people for China to “help reverse the coup”, calls which turned into angry accusations and threats when they proved futile. The attacks on Chinese factories in March, as well as threats made towards the China-Myanmar oil and gas pipeline (China’s most important infrastructure project in Myanmar) are further evidence of the severe damage China’s stance on the military coup is having on its image and credibility, as well as the future of its projects in Myanmar.  

Even if the junta proves willing to cater to China’s demands in future due to a lack of other reliable partners, Beijing will have to be very vigilant about the local and international reputational cost of such cooperation. Not only will China be portrayed as an accomplice to the coup, but it will also be seen as supporting the junta for selfish reasons. Similarly hostile perceptions have in the past led to the suspension, renegotiation or even cancellation of Chinese projects signed with the junta that was in power up to 2011. Now China is standing in front of the same trap again.  

As the dust settles following February’s coup, some of the traditional certainties are reemerging in Sino-Myanmar bilateral relations. This time around, though, sticking to its tried-and-trusted approach carries plenty of risk for China.

---